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Abstract—Building upon previous research in honeynets and 
simulations, we present efforts from a two-and-a-half-year study 
using a representative simulation to collect cybersecurity data.  
Unlike traditional honeypots or honeynets, our experiment utilizes 
a full-scale operational network to model a small business 
environment. The simulation uses default security configurations 
to defend the network, testing the assumption that given standard 
security baseline, devices networked to the public Internet will 
necessarily be hacked. Given network activity appropriate for its 
context, results support the conclusion that no actors where able 
to break in, despite only default security settings.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is a known problem that cybersecurity is lacking in 
comparative or experimental data, due to difficulties with data 
collection methodologies and concerns with sharing potentially 
sensitive data [1] [2].  This is particularly problematic for the 
state of cybersecurity, as decision makers set policies and 
procedures that are not always grounded in evidence from 
empirical research.    
We contribute to the cybersecurity data collection effort by 
the development and deployment of representative simulations.  
These convincing simulations monitor and collect activity from 
mock users and potential intruders, generating high-fidelity data 
on how adversaries compromise systems and interact with them 
once inside. 
The simulated network is tailored to reflect the perceived 
size and technical sophistication of the business or institution 
that the intruders believe they are interacting with. From the 
outside, it should appear as though a real organization is using 
the network to conduct its daily operations.  This method is 
distinct from traditional honeypots or honeynets as discussed in 
[3].  Our method provides the model for studying our initial 
research hypothesis presented in this piece.   
We theorized that deploying a representative simulation will 
not necessarily result in system compromise.  This finding is in 
contrast to some conventional wisdom that by default all 
Internet-connected systems will be successfully hacked.   We 
find no unexpected activity, malicious or otherwise anomalous, 
suggesting that no intruders were able to break in.  Additionally, 
despite ongoing probing including known port scans and web 
crawlers, we did not find evidence of any further probing 
attempts such as targeted phishing emails to the simulated email 
addresses.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  First, we 
review existing related research to honeypots, honeynets, and 
simulations and cyber data collection efforts.  Second, we 
describe our research method and to frame and contextualize our 
experiment.  Third, we present findings from the two-and-a-
half-year study, yielding evidence which challenges the popular 
myth that “everything connected to the Internet necessarily will 
be hacked”. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Traditional honeynets have a number of limitations in their 
ability to produce the types of empirical results discussed 
here.  First, the honeypots they are comprised of generally 
employ limited (if any) camouflage and thus are easily 
identifiable as honeypots by even low- to moderately- 
sophisticated adversaries [4].  Second, deploying and 
reconfiguring honeynets for experimental purposes has been 
cost-prohibitive due to high costs of fixed-asset honeypots and 
a lack of utilization of virtualization technologies.  Third, 
traditional honeypots -- even so-called "high interaction 
honeypots" -- generally have not employed active user behavior 
emulation methods.   
These factors limit the ability of traditional honeynets to 
monitor adversaries'  Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 
(TTPs)  which depend on some type of user interaction to 
trigger an event [4].  However, advances in virtualization and 
cloud computing technologies have provided an alternative that 
allows for the development of comprehensive, flexible, and 
well-camouflaged simulations which can accurately emulate 
live production systems in an empirically-valid manner.  
Table 1: Hallmark Honeypot, Honeynet, and Simulation Research 
Category Features Examples References 
Honeypot 
– Low 
Interaction 
Basic listening 
services to log 
connections 
HoneyC [5], [6] 
Honeypot 
– High 
Interaction 
Services such as web 
servers to provide 
some sort of response 
Argos [7] [8] 
Simulation Full-scale 
environments with 
standard security 
configuration 
Chameleon [3] [9] 
	 Given the lack of robust methods to eliciting attackers to 
monitor their activity, we developed the Chameleon model to 
generate representative simulations to model, simulate, and 
collect dependable cybersecurity data [3].  We employ this 
model in this study, describing the simulation context in the next 
section.  In this paper we present evidence of the feasibility of 
using Chameleon method, finding support that this method can 
attract activity, from which can monitor potential adversaries. 
III. METHODS AND MATERIALS 
 Building on our previous work, we instantiated a small 
financial services simulation [3].  This simulation sought to elicit 
attackers interested in financial data or targeting small business.  
We publicized the simulation with an alluring website to 
promote the company’s services.  Figure 1 below presents the 
symbolic Model-Object relationship for creating an instance of 
a model simulation geared towards a specific operational 
context. 
Figure 1: The Model-Object Relationship for our Simulations 
 
A. Control Variables: Instance Features  
We deployed the business with five systems: two windows 
desktops, a webserver, a customer database, and a 
router/firewall.  In each system, we created artifacts appropriate 
to its operating context (for instance, realistically fictitious 
names, addresses, and social security numbers in the customer 
database).  As an initial experiment, we intended the following 
to be evident: 1) the simulation should appear to be a small 
operation with minimal technical expertise implying minimal 
adherence to security best practices; 2) appliances and 
workstations configured using default settings from the 
manufacturer with little modification; 3) the database containing 
customer data should appear realistic; however, the 
corresponding social security numbers would not match an 
individual’s birth time; 4) the simulation should consist of 
commonly used operating systems; 5) machines should be 
reasonably patched; and 6) should an attacker penetrate the 
firewall the machines contained within would appear to be 
workstations of the aforementioned  small business [10]. 
The simulation used then-current versions of Windows, a 
commonly-used open-source software firewall installed on a 
commonly-used version of a UNIX-based operating system, and 
then-current versions of a common web server, all of which were 
maintained as virtualized appliances within our simulation 
environment.  The network configuration included standard 
network address translation (NAT) with open outbound rules 
and no inbound permissions except port 80 (HTTP).  Intra-
simulation traffic was unrestricted.  To maintain operational 
camouflage, we used a commercial Internet service provider, 
employing the level of service appropriate to the context of a 
business like that we simulated.  This provided both general 
network camouflage and IP address camouflage. 
B. Experimental Variable: Security Configuration 
The simulation was designed to minimize the number of 
attack vectors both to test hypothesis (2) and to create a 
“control” for future experiments. To accomplish this, the 
firewall configuration was restricted as described above, and no 
software or hardware with unpatched known vulnerabilities was 
deployed.  
To further facilitate camouflage, the website was 
intentionally designed to appear outdated and was purposely 
designed to give attackers the impression that the business 
lacked technical sophistication.  	
Data points were collected using an array of separate 
collectors enabled on each machine or application. The 
collectors on the individual workstations would collect system 
logs generated by the operating system and forward them to a 
separate server, detached from the simulation.   This data would 
be aggregated with logs from the web server and intrusion 
detection system (IDS) package from the firewall. These logs 
will correlate and validate abnormal activity detected within the 
simulation.  	
Prior to deploying our simulation on a live public network, 
we conducted a penetration test as a control to evaluate the any 
potential vulnerabilities and identify possible attack vectors we 
expect attackers to utilize.  The results of that penetration test 
revealed no known vulnerabilities.  
IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
Our study had two experimental conditions:  (1) determine 
if we could deploy camouflage adequate to attract 
representative potentially-malicious traffic; and (2) assuming 
(1), determine the extent to which a default baseline security 
configuration would be compromised over different time 
periods. 	
Regarding hypothesis (2), we specifically were interested 
in creating a baseline for evaluation of network 
penetration/attack surface risk.  Many security professionals, 
scientists, and even the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) 
have taken the position that any device connected to the public 
Internet essentially will be compromised, and the only question 
is when.  While potentially true from a strict theoretical 
standpoint, such advice is less helpful to organizations which 
(unlike the DoD) lack the resources to maintain high-reliability 
operational environments.  A more plausible hypothesis, we 
propose, firewall is that overinvestment in high-reliability 
perimeter defenses detracts from investment in other areas of 
security, creating more viable avenues of attack.   
We evaluate this hypothesis using the simulation described 
above in Methods and Materials.  We evaluated this 
configuration over approximately a two-year period examining 
both hypotheses (1) and (2).  The dependent variables, 
presented in further detail below, are a series of known 
indicators-of-compromise (IoC) identified and measured on the 
emulated devices.	
A. Data 
Our study ran from December 2015 - July 2018. During the 
course of the simulation, we did not inject any emulated user 
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activity. We relied strictly upon capturing activity associated 
with external actors. 
B. Eliciting Activity 
Hypothesis (1) is important because, if our simulation fails 
to attract traffic representative of a what a contextually-similar 
organization would attract, our results will lack external and 
construct validity.  Accordingly, we evaluate hypothesis (1) to 
determine if our simulation attracts such traffic.  HTTP-based 
web traffic is our primary metric as this is the only open port 
and the primary method of “advertisement” of our simulation. 
Our results, presented in the figures below, indicate that 
representative traffic was achieved for the period in question. 
 
  
 
  
C. (Attempted) Attacks? 
The simulation we designed accurately simulates the 
network of a small financial services firm. This is supported by 
our traffic data, which is appropriate for such an operation. Our 
data also shows evidence of potential adversaries gathering 
information about our network, through port scanning. 
Despite many port scans and web crawls, our dataset finds 
no evidence of a compromise. We analyzed records from OS, 
application, and webserver logs and found zero indicators of 
compromise. This finding challenges the general attitude that 
simply being connected to the internet is a massive risk. 
V. LIMITATIONS & FUTURE WORK 
Given the level of sophistication within the simulation and 
the lack of advertising outside of an active website, it is possible 
the simulation did not receive a significant level, or reasonably 
malicious variety, of traffic to gather enough data.  While 
advertising methods are being evaluated in future simulations, 
we view this simulation as a network “idling” on the Internet.  
It is not making active requests for data, but it is available for 
requests and queries.  
Additionally, we recognize that the simulation is not 
necessarily representative of all or even a portion of networks 
on the Internet.  This project is a prototype experiment to test 
the feasibility of such an effort to realistically model and cole.   
Ideally, the project’s future simulations will focus on 
enhancing user simulation, and the programmatic development 
and deployment of custom simulations.  We claim that the 
future of cybersecurity data collection will heavily rely on 
advanced simulation technologies.  We aim for this project to 
serve as a prototype of such efforts. 
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